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## Approved For Release 2002/01/03A:RMTP7#203728W0200030006-7 completed\*

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27 April 1970


Major General Kenneth G. Wickham
The Adjutant General
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20315

Mickham

ACAR-5 (9521)/3)

Dear General Wickham:

In response to your request dated 13 March 1970 (Reference AGAR-S (9521)/3) the attached documents were reviewed. This Agency concurs in the declassification and has no objections to the release of these documents to Mr. Mark Stoler, an unofficial researcher.



STATINTL

Attachments: 3 pages of notes Nos. 211, 225, and 226

Distribution:

Orig. and 1 Addressee 1 OSS File

1 RAB File

DDS/SSS/RAB

(27 Apr 70)

Approved 002/01/09 : CIA-RDP74-00390R000200030006-7

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Approved For Release 2002/01/09: CIA-RDP74-00390R000200030006-7

22 April 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR:

25X1A

SUBJECT

Request from The Adjutant General's

Office for Declassification of OSS

Documents

REFERENCE

AGAR-S (9521)/3

1. Returned herewith are the documents from the Department of the Army which they have requested to be reviewed to determine if they can now be declassified.

2. The Office of Security and the CI Staff have no objections to the declassification of subject documents. Accordingly, the Strategic Services Unit authorizes you to advise the Department of the Army that the documents may be declassified and used for the purposes specified in their memorandum.

Executive Secretary, SSU

Attachments:
As stated above

25X1A


## Approved For Release 2002/01/09: CIA-RDP74-00390R000200030006-7

18 March 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Strategic Services Unit

SUBJECT : Declassification of Mark Stoler Notes

The Adjutant General's Office proposes to declassify the attached notes made by Mr. Mark Stoler from OSS originated documents if there are no objections from this Agency. May I have your concurrence or comments.




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## Attachments:

- Trans fr TAGO
   Notes #9521/3; pages 211, 225, 226.

17 MAR 1970



## DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

AGAR-S (9521)/3

1 0 MAR 1970

25X1A

Records Administration Officer Central Intelligence Agency Washington, DC 20505

25X1A

Mr. Mark Stoler, an unofficial researcher in Army files, has taken a number of classified notes in his study of "Politics of the Second Front: American Military Planning and Foreign Policy in Europe, 1941-1945." Among them were two notes of 3 pages, from OSS-originated documents. Copies of these are attached.

The Department of State and this Department have no objections to the declassification of these notes. If there are no objections within your agency, this office will declassify the attached 3 pages and return them to Mr. Stoler.

Your comment is requested.

Sincerely,

Cyrus H. Fraker for JACK I. GUTHRIE

Acting Chief, Office Management Division

Inclosures 3 pages of notes Numbers 211, 225 and 226, classified SECRET

STATE

Security Classification

Holos When from the Records of man applications are an accommon assurance

Type of Decimens Memorandum

This seis. Intelligence Reports -- "Roston Series". In intelligence reports re: "ermany, is something on Russia:

Hovember 3, 1943-Prior to Moscow Conference, Stalin told French General Gouraud (might be toger Garreau, Delegate at Moscow of Trench Committee of Liberation) Soviet war alms: "A. To absorb the Baltic Countries into Soviet Russia.

2. The western border of Poland is to be the Oder River and its eastern border is to be that of 1941.

3. The Rhineland is to be independent.

1. Bessarabia and Bukovina are to become Soviet republics.

4. Under the sponsorship of the Soviet Union, there is to be a Balkan Entente.

6. Geomingly, there is desired an entente with England

7. Austria is to be independent

8. There is to be free passage through the Straits of Dardanelles. However, there are to demands for territory against Turkey.

9. There are no claims on East Asia."

March Carps Burns Service

Memorandum 381 (9-2-4-L) Sec. VII P.G.40/1

8/6/43

Masoss Planning Group JCS

"Manifesto to German People by Moscow National Committee of Free Germany"

Purpose of paper is to advise JCS of psychological and political implications of the manifest "The manifesto seems to reflect confidence in Russia's military and political strength in the present situation and her determination to provoke at least a limited revolution in . Germany before any peace negotiations. It could serve equally well as cover for a scharate peace between the Soviet and a militarist regime in Germany or for a far-reaching program of evertual invasion and Bolshevization." But this unilateral move does not necessarily mean that Bussia is determined to pursue a "lone wolf" policy towards Germany. Whatever Bussian intentions, Manifesto may have far-reaching implications from many points of view-psychologic warfare implicationsx. Also, it would put Russia at a great advantage over U.S. and Britain in negotiations with Germans. As for political implications,

"The political implications of this manifesto are not only far-reaching from the Sovic Wewpoint but disturbing from the ideological and political viewpoint of the United States And Great Britain." -- Manifesto, while aimed at overthrow of Hitler government, also contempla es a government favorable to Moscow. "This might result in a communistic Germany, which would scarcely be acceptable to the United States and Great Britain." Also, success in MANIfesto might lead to breakdown of German resistance -- this would put Russia in a position, "with forces on the field" to arrange peace and German government "to its liking." Also, the manifesto represents "a major political move." -- probably timed to coincide with eastern victories and increased air activity in west -- Germany may now be seeking peace --winter coming, Italy knocked out. All we offer Germans is unconditional surrender -- no maurances against vengeance by occupied peoples.

"Complete political unity does not exist between the Soviet Union and the other United Hations, and political differences arising out of the manifesto may lead to a dangerous situation between these countries. The possible dangers to our military and political stribegy are such that a re-examination of our American political position as it relates to the manifesto is indicated." But, at the same time, Germany can use this opportunity to exploit political disunity among allies -- avoid premature or hasty steps that would wreck or postpone our basic objective -- total defeat of Germany.

Conclusions:

1) Manifesto may have great psychological value in overthrowing Hitler--good.

2) "Present Soviet policy towards post-war political development in Germany as reflected in the manifesto is dangerous in its implications in that it might result in a government apposed to the political and idealistic principles for which we are fighting. Our political position will be greatly enhanced as our military forces arrive on the continent of Europe." 3) We should continue to use all psychological warfare and military pressures toward overthrow of Hitler and total defeat of Germany.

4) If a joint Anglo-American-Sovjet policy is not established, "we must be prepared at the psycholigical time to present to Germany conditions which will offset the Russian proposals i

the armistice and the peace."

Copy of manifesto follows, with appendices. Appendix B links the manifesto with press reports on it and other events--part IV links it to Soviet intervention against eastern Cederations -- reveals determined hostility to any grouping of the smaller states of central all state from hours, and

ABC (continued)

381 (9-25-11) Sec. VII OSS Planning Group

er pourtheastern Europe." These are all negative aspects of Soviet policy, and Soviet policy also has positive aspects (negative aspects are apprehension of the objectives of an Englothe paper then lists meriain Soviet moves -- the Hungarian Front for National Independence, set up under Soviet compilees, consolidation of position in northern Iran, the Polish Union in Moscow and the Totish Legion, the approaches to the "ritish on a treaty with Czechoslovakia, Sovie" interest in Chinese Communists, support of Tito, "vigorous revival" of Pan-Slavism, and the Free Garmany Committee.

"These examples of Soviet activities indicate that the 'discountion' of the Comintern mu, in fact, a clearing of the decks for intensifying nationalistic policy." The Polish latriots and the Free German Committee are built around old Polish and German sections of

Une Comintern. The basic question is which of the following policies (or which 2, or Markemore) is being and managed: reduce enemy's will to resist; combat suspected machinetions for an "Anglo-American-Voligan" peace at Soviet expense; world revolution; traditional Russian imperialism. The Committee fits into a pattern of Soviet moves leading up to this that began with Stalin's speech of Newsonsh November 7, 1942 -- Committee was the result of long and careful planningbut up by the Kremlin. 1939 pact and Baltic moves hint to policy number hy-imperialism

"Examination of the manifesto and of the circumstances attending it underlies the fact that complete political unity does not exist between the Soviet Union and the other United Hations . Indeed, Soviet mistrust of Great Britain and the United States remains openly manifest. The Soviet Union has been waging a singularly independent war. In anticipation of collapse, Germany may become susceptible to Soviet manipulation. In such an event, the U.S. and Great Britian might find themselves unable to effectively intervene politically wither in Germany, the Middle Zone (between Germany and Russia), or in southeastern Europe."

